No hay duda que la cuestión de los trascendentales y su posible distinción atrajo la atención de los pensadores del siglo XIII. Sin embargo, este tema siguió caminos diversos. En tal sentido, la Summa Halensis propone un abordaje que no sólo delimita cada transcendental en sí, sino que además los incorpora al plano soteriológico humano. Así, el presente trabajo se ocupará de ambos aspectos.

La especulación filosófica suele observar que lo feo y el mal carecen de entidad y que sólo pueden ser considerados como una belleza y bondad menguadas. Sin embargo, esta disminución entitativa no constituye sólo una carencia, sino que además puede ofrecer en sí la posibilidad de una belleza y un bien mayores. En este sentido, pensar la belleza del mal no ha constituido para muchos autores antiguos y medievales una imposibilidad lógica, sino por el contrario una nueva manera de hablar (...) de la Belleza del Universo. Este ha sido el parecer agustino y dionisiano, y es también el que asume la conocida Summa Halensis, aunque desde una óptica cuya originalidad radica en la integración de esas tradiciones. Analizar cómo la Summa Halensis entiende que la belleza es capaz de integrar a lo malo, es la intención del presente trabajo. (shrink)

Within the deep philosophical reflection of the thirteenth century are commonly heard names such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. However, little is said of those disciples of lesser brilliance who spread the thought of their teachers. Such is the case of Ulrich of Strasbourg. This Dominican friar, a fellow student of Thomas Aquinas in Cologne, studied under Albertus Magnus the De Divinis nominibus of Pseudo-Dionysius. Years later, Ulrich wrote a work called Summa de bono where, in dealing with (...) beauty, a unique Neoplatonic synthesis operates, but from the original perspective of his master. This paper analyses the concept of beauty present in Ulrich of Strasbourg to show how there is as much clear dependence on Albertian Neoplatonism as there is originality in the presentation of the topic. (shrink)

This article addresses the topic of artistic mímēsis, and attempts to illuminate the contemporary discussion between two seemingly irreconcilable positions. The first, framed in a traditional interpretation of Aristotelian texts, considers the work of art as an imitation of nature, finding in it its only rule. The second, supported by a different interpretation, states that, according to Aristotle himself, artistic creativity is fictional, that is, independent of natural reality, and therefore debtor only of the artist’s subjectivity. However, when considering the (...) analogy between téchnē and phýsis, within Aristotle’s teleological worldview, it is possible to notice a kind of “common work” that harmonizes them. In this context, and advancing on the consideration of the mimetic poiésis, the philosopher’s texts allow an interpretation that, without detaching itself from the original naturalness of art and taking it as a guide, opens the horizon to the artist’s creativity. (shrink)

Nursing research using concept analysis plays a critical role for knowledge development, particularly when concerning to broad and foundational concepts for nursing practice, such as dignity. This study aimed to synthesize research concerning concept analysis of dignity in nursing care. Based on a literature review, electronic databases were searched using the terms “dignity,” “human dignity,” “concept analysis,” and nurs*. Papers in Portuguese or English were included. The research synthesis was conducted independently by two reviewers. A total of 35 citations were (...) identified and seven papers were included. Six studies were elected using Walker and Avant concept analysis methodology while one applied the Beth Rodgers evolutionary model. The concept of dignity has been studied by nurses, and its attributes, antecedents, consequences, and similar concepts were synthesized into a definition. Dignity emerged as a fundamental concept in nursing ethics and the main attributes synthesized were personhood, sociability, respect, and autonomy. The antecedents identified were: facilitators—patient focus care, recognition, education, and ethical competence; threats—vulnerability and organizational environment. The consequences were positive coping, empowerment, and dignity preservation. The synthesis of these seven studies using concept analysis provided a clear definition of dignity. These findings challenge future research and education, particularly for the study of undergraduate and postgraduate nursing education programs to enhance skills for preserving patient dignity in clinical practice. (shrink)

Much evidence has accumulated in favor of such a dual view of reasoning. There is however some vagueness in the way the two systems are characterized. Instead of a principled distinction, we are presented with a bundle of contrasting features - slow/fast, automatic/controlled, explicit/implicit, associationist/rule based, modular/central - that, depending on the specific dual process theory, are attributed more or less exclusively to one of the two systems. As Evans states in a recent review, “it would then be helpful to (...) have some clear basis for this distinction”; he also suggests that “we might be better off talking about type 1 and type 2 processes” rather than systems. We share the intuitions that drove the development of dual system theories. Our goal here is to propose in the same spirit a principled distinction between two types of inferences: ‘intuitive inference’ and ‘reflective inference’. We ground this distinction in a massively modular view of the human mind where metarepresentational modules play an important role in explaining the peculiarities of human psychological evolution. We defend the hypothesis that the main function of reflective inference is to produce and evaluate arguments occurring in interpersonal communication. This function, we claim, helps explain important aspects of reasoning. We review some of the existing evidence and argue that it gives support to this approach. (shrink)

One of the problems in post-Kantian discussions is the way in which the self procures access to itself. Kant rejects intellectual intuition in human knowledge. Nonetheless, he supposes an access of the self to itself as subject in all conscious knowledge. It is then fitting to ask how this access can occur. Because, if the self is to be taken precisely as subject, in other words as an activity that knows objects, this knowledge of the self should be of a (...) different kind to that in which all the objects already constituted by that activity are known. Fichte or Schelling are usually taken to be the first to have addressed and tried to solve this problem. But Salomon Maimon had already done so in 1789 and had proposed a solution based on intellectual intuition. The aim of this article is to reconstruct Maimon’s arguments, evaluate his proposal, and specifically show that his attempt is the first in which the Kantian problem is addressed and a solution put forward. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to describe the mechanism of the public perception of risk of artificial intelligence. For that we apply the social amplification of risk framework to the public perception of artificial intelligence using data collected from Twitter from 2007 to 2018. We analyzed when and how there appeared a significant representation of the association between risk and artificial intelligence in the public awareness of artificial intelligence. A significant finding is that the image of the risk of (...) AI is mostly associated with existential risks that became popular after the fourth quarter of 2014. The source of that was the public positioning of experts who happen to be the real movers of the risk perception of AI so far instead of actual disasters. We analyze here how this kind of risk was amplified, its secondary effects, what are the varieties of risk unrelated to existential risk, and what is the dynamics of the experts in addressing their concerns to the audience of lay people. (shrink)

The three main Chinese teachings can all be used to develop a framework for corporate governance in China. Recently, the Confucian classic the Dizi gui has emerged as a matter of academic and social interest in Mainland China. Some entrepreneurs have decided to revert to the moral rules set out in this book to decide on complex moral dilemma. Our research aims to explore an actual case in which a business leader from Beijing succeeded in transforming his moral aspiration into (...) a viable business model. Willing to break out from a deteriorated business environment in which he was competing, he used the Dizi gui to develop a set of moral principles, out of which he articulated his decision-making strategy. (shrink)

The anticipation of the typical under the assumption of the non-occurrence of the atypical is the experiential schema governing the individuation of ordinary enduring objects and their properties. Against this background, a primitive form of “if-and-only-if” consciousness is implicit in our everyday perceptual intentions. The thematization of the fact that perception operates under this proto-tentative structure occurs at the level of reflection and is expressed by defeasible judgments of the form “if p, then q, unless r,” or “if p, then (...) q provided that not-r”. Here I will argue that what is made thematic by judgments containing such restrictive clauses is the structure of unpredictability inherent in what Husserl calls the horizon of latency and, indirectly, the world as background of normality. (shrink)

The world’s elderly population is growing, and in Chile they represent 16.2% of the total population. In Chile, old age is marked by retirement, with a dramatic decrease in income that brings precariousness. Older adults are economically, socially, and psychologically vulnerable populations. This condition increases their likelihood of disengaging from their usual social environment, facilitating their isolation, sadness, and discomfort. From the perspective of social identity, well-being can be explained by two principles: social groups’ importance for health and people’s psychological (...) identification with those groups. This study analyzes the relationships between belonging to the neighborhood and extra-neighborhood groups and neighborhood social identification with WB. Urban or rural location and gender are measured, and the sample is 1,475 older Chilean adults of both sexes. The results show that the majority are not members of social groups, and the remaining 48% are members of one or two groups or organizations. Only 4.47% belong to three groups or organizations. Those who belong to groups obtain higher scores, emotional–mental WB, and positive emotions than older adults who do not belong to any organization. Urban and rural older adults have the same level of WB. Membership in close social organizations or distant ones causes different WB associations. Membership in neighborhood councils reduces gender differences in self-assessment of health. This result supports the idea that participation in heterogeneous groups with a shared sense of belonging to the neighborhood is associated with higher WB and lower perceived loneliness. Social identification with the neighborhood, rather than belonging to the group, had the most widespread impact on WB and health indicators. The variable social identification with the neighborhood was consistently associated with indicators of hedonic WB. (shrink)

1. The question “Why do we have the rights we do?” obviously presupposes that we do have some rights; that is, that propositions of the form ‘We have the right to x,’ or of the form ‘We have the right to do x,’ are true for certain values of x. The same issues would arise if the original question had been formulated, or were to be reformulated, as it sometimes is, in a purely existential manner, viz., “Why are there the (...) rights there are?” I believe there is no difference between the two questions except a verbal one; at least, both of them share the same existential presupposition to the effect that there are certain rights. I mention this point for two reasons. One is merely to acknowledge the trivial but true point that the question in my title does have an existential presupposition. The second and more important point is that since I shall have very little to say about any actual rights, I would not want anyone to infer from my silence that I do not think we have any rights. I accept the presupposition of my original question, but I shall not dwell upon it. 2. One might ask my original question and mean by rights, legal rights, that is, rights identified through the legal provisions of some legal system. That is not the sense in which I pose the question. It is true that a legal positivist would be able to give no intelligible meaning to my question except by treating it as equivalent to asking, “Why do we have the legal rights we do?” However, since I am not a legal positivist, I want my question understood in another way. (shrink)

En el texto se hace hincapié en los tenebrosos elementos sacrificiales que le ha acarreado al movimiento estudiantil perteneciente a la combativa Escuela Normal Rural de Ayotzinapa, situada en el Estado mexicano de Guerrero, dominado por el narcotráfico y un gobierno municipal que actúa en complicidad con este último. Se trata de un establecimiento que, además de formar maestros populares, se halla enrolado en las luchas sociales y políticas. A fines de 2014 fueron reprimidos brutalmente y objeto de desaparición forzosa (...) unos 43 alumnos de esa Escuela, lo cual dio lugar a una ininterrumpida protesta civil con muy diversos ribetes internos y mundiales cuyas múltiples expresiones procuran explicitarse en el trabajo. Por otra parte, se incursiona en el trasfondo ideológico que viene acompañando el devenir institucional mexicano bajo el manto del neoliberalismo -al cual el autor ha optado por reconceptuar como neuroliberalismo en distintos ensayos suyos y en colaboración. Conjuntamente, se enfoca la problemática en cuestión desde un ángulo doctrinario y existencial específico: el del necropoder y el pensamiento crítico. Entre los referentes bibliográficos principales pueden citarse desde Foucault y Mbembe a Holloway y González Casanova. The paper deals with the engagement of mexican student movement in Ayotzinapa Rural College and the repressive way that the local goverment and the narco-maffia fought against those students, with the disappearance and destruction of their bodies and cadavers, around september 2014. The case has an enormous influence in world and local public opinion, with different movilizations and artistic expressions that have a very critical reading of Mexican treatment in the field of Human Rights. Mexican and international neoliberalism, as well as bio and necropolitics, has been specially analyzed with the auxiliary tool of critical thinking. Between the theoretical authors that are close involved in these approaches, we can find Michel Foucault, Achille Mbembe, John Holloway and Pablo González Casanova. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER HUGO MEYNELL University of Calgary Calgary, Alberta IN THE FOLLOWING essay I w;ant to examine some of rthe ba1Sic ~deas of Heidegger from SIOmething of a " transcendiental Thomist " pevspective, 1 as represented by Bernard Lonergian's " generalized empirical method." I believe that there are a nlllmber of important insights :to be gained from Heidegger's work but that it contains a (...) fow very perilous oversights as well. To my mind, Heidegger shows with more conviction and power than any other thinker how our anxieties and our trivi1al everyday concerns are apt to shut us out from 1apprehending the deep my;stery of things, and how great art :and poetry, together with a,sustained thinking-through of the nmbure of consciousness :and of the woJ.'11d 1 wihich it reveals, have the power of opening up this mystery to us again.. I ailso agree with Heidegger when he says that the technicaiL fanguages of the scieDJoes and of traditional metaphysics as weH al'le, to a consiiew, one has to dismantle the conceptual appa- :vaitus which we take for granted, an appara;bus wherein the answers are given or presuppos,ed, but the questions al'e never e1q>erienced any more-least of all those aborut orur own nature, desbiny, and state in the wol'l1d. In asking these questions, we must be constantly ·aware of the limitations which aiccrue mom our particular historical sitruation.5 These were not sufficiently taken account of in the dassicaJ. phenomenology of Husserl, with its "transcendental subjectivity " based on an allegedly "d!isintel'ested observer." For all. its determination to 11eturn :to" the things themselves," this phenomerno~ogy did not attend sufficiently to the manner in which its own aims :and IJ[>ocedures we:ve determined historicaUy.6 Husserl, as he himself aJC1knowledged, was very much in the tradition of Descartes, who was trying to find an uns:hakabJe basis for the practice of phll.osophy. But it is just this basis which Heidegger seeks to prut into qruestion.7 We have to a.sk what is the decisiY.e matter for,thinking: "Is it consciousness and its objectivity or is it the Being of beings in its unconcealedness and concealment?" 8 Access to the things themselves is best thought of in true Greek fashion as " aletheia, the unoonceaJ.edness of what is present, iits being revealed, its showing itself." 9 (A,s he quite often does, Heidegger is here making capital out of ·an etymological point; " aletheia," the Greek word for """.t-1.,, • • 1 " i-th. " cealm t),..,ruuu, iI.S eqwv:a1ent to a- e ei,a, non~con · en. So what is basic to truth, irt must be inferred, is not the 00['rectness of assertions, or their cor11espondence with states of a:fiaim, or the :agreement of subjoot and object express1 ed by them; it is the self-showing which is necessary for things if 5 Cf. Krell, "Introduction," 21. 6 Ibid., 13. 7 Cf. Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 8-9; Krell, 31. On the alleged errors of Descartes, see BT 123-33. sHeidegger, On Tflrne and Bemg (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 79; Krell, 14. oHeidegger, loc. cit., Krell, 13. 616 HUGO MEYNELL they 1arie to become objects of assertions.at all.10 The £.act is that.rulil (lO!l'respondence, " rudequation "11 or whatev. (shrink)